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Review
War and Individual Rights: The Foundation of
Just War Theory
Kai Draper. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 272pp.

Nathan Wood*
Rights are a cornerstone of much contemporary moral and political philosophy. They tell
us what we are owed by others, what protections we enjoy against both private citizens and
against the state, and they inform us of the restrictions on our freedom that morality and
law demand.
However, despite the seeming hegemony of rights in political and moral
discourse, there exists a theory that casts doubt on them, namely, the theory of the just war.
The argument goes something like this. War kills, and notoriously, war kills not only those
who are (arguably) liable to be killed. It is not just the unjust warrior, or even the just
warrior who lie among the fallen, but also non-combatants and neutral parties, bystanders
and children. War maims and kills the guilty and the innocent alike, infringing upon and
violating rights on a grand scale. It would seem, then, that a respect for rights would
demand outright rejection of war or, alternatively, that the possibility of wars being just
tarnishes the very idea of rights. Either way, it would seem that one has to go.
In War and Individual Rights, Kai Draper resists this conclusion, arguing for a
rights-based account of the just war. The book attempts to provide a framework of rights
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that can accommodate common moral intuitions about the values of freedom, autonomy,
and safety, while also developing a moral guide for the enforcement of our rights. The
author then argues that such a rights-enforcement account can explain how war can
sometimes be justified, even in spite of the fact that it often results in the foreseeable deaths
of innocents. More than this, Draper argues that war can sometimes be the best, or indeed
only, means to enforce rights, if certain conditions are met.
One of the main contributions of the book is its effort to begin with a foundational
moral and political value—namely rights—and use it alone to develop an account of the
just war. This provides a level of clarity and precision of argumentation that is often lacking
in works on just war theory, as it is common to focus on aspects of morality and war without
making clear one’s prior philosophical commitments and how those may impact on the
conclusions. The explicit and faithful reliance on rights has the added benefit of making
Draper’s work relevant to both scholars working from within the rights-based philosophical
tradition and those opposed to it, as his assumptions and intuitions are laid bare at the
outset, removing a potentially significant source of disagreement. As such, even a purely
utilitarian student of the morality of war may gain much from War and Individual Rights
by seeing how a rights theorist argues from within that tradition, without being distracted
by the justifications of that tradition itself.
The book begins by sketching its broad methodological commitments and then
presents a Lockean framework for rights. In these sections Draper highlights that his
starting point is as much strategic and political as it is philosophical, as one of the aims of
the book is to provide a just war theory that is palatable and useful to policy-makers and
military strategists from his own country, the United States. As the Lockean tradition has
tremendous influence in both the founding documents of the United States and many of the
current political, moral, and legal practices, it provides a useful point of departure.
Moreover, theorists who reject the Lockean theory of rights will at least concede that its
understanding of justice, self-ownership, autonomy, and well-being infuse many common
moral intuitions about rights, making it a natural starting point for such an account.
The core of Draper’s account is the right of self-ownership, which is violated
whenever an individual unjustifiably harms another. Self-ownership gives rise to a number
of other rights, and also sets the stage for Draper’s account of self-defense and rightsenforcement. He argues that it can be permissible to harm an aggressor when such harm
“eliminates or at least reduces the threat of unjust harm posed by the aggressor, where to
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pose a threat of unjust harm is to behave in such a way that, barring preventive action, one
will infringe upon rights and thereby jeopardize interests protected by those rights” (67).
His rights-enforcement principle is not only deontological in nature though, as it
includes within it necessity and proportionality restrictions which demand that the harm
one impose on an aggressor be necessary for the elimination or reduction of unjust harm
(necessity), and also that the harm imposed on an aggressor be proportionate to the unjust
harm that is eliminated or reduced (proportionality). Importantly, his conceptions of
necessity and proportionality discuss not “goods and bads achieved,” as is common in
much just war literature, but rather tracks to his rights-based account and is, therefore,
concerned with “elimination or reduction of unjust harm.” As a result, it is possible for his
account to render impermissible certain acts that might be overall beneficial, in a utilitarian
sense, if those acts would not reduce unjust harm. Therefore, his account tracks the
common intuition that it is wrong to kill one innocent for the sake of saving two innocents,
because in such a scenario there is no reduction in unjust harm, only a reduction in harm.
In developing an account that is concerned with unjust harm, and not simply harm
as such, it is also crucial that there be an accounting of the distinction between doing harm
and merely allowing harm to occur, as this is generally taken to be a core difference
between justice-based theories of morality and war and consequence- or utility-based
accounts. In exploring this distinction Draper makes a significant contribution to the
literature on the doctrine of doing and allowing harm (hereafter DDA). His treatment of
DDA provides compelling analysis of the state of the literature, and probes deeply into
underlying aspects of causation and responsibility that are crucial for properly
understanding or employing DDA. Moreover, he persuasively argues that his rightsenforcement account provides a stronger basis for DDA than competing deontological
theories, and that it better explains the relevance of DDA for moral decision-making.
However, the greatest accomplishment of Draper’s work is to be found in chapter
six, where he argues against the doctrine of double effect and related principles, arguing
that a rights-based account can accommodate the intuitions thought to be supported by such
principles, without inheriting their problems. Very roughly, the doctrine of double effect
maintains that unintentionally but foreseeably killing innocents can be justified if (1) their
deaths are not intended (that is, only the good is intended), (2) the good secured by the
action that caused their deaths greatly outweighs the moral disvalue of their deaths, and (3)
their deaths are not a means to the securing of the good. Given that the principle purports
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to provide a justification for bringing about the deaths of innocents, it has become virtually
ubiquitous in deontological just war theories. However, despite its regular employment,
the doctrine of double effect has suffered significant and compelling criticism from
philosophers of all stripes. Draper argues that these critiques cannot be surmounted, and
that the intuitions the doctrine seeks to explain can be better accommodated via a rightsenforcement account. His arguments to this effect are subtle and incisive, and serve to lay
a sound deontological foundation for how and when killing the innocent may be
permissible without committing one to any of the errors that accompany the doctrine of
double effect or related principles. This alone makes Draper’s account well worth exploring
for any student of the morality of war.
In chapters seven through ten, Draper applies his principles and findings to
situations of war, exploring the rights of innocent bystanders in war, and when those may
be permissibly infringed upon (chapter seven), how war can be justified at all given a
rights-enforcement account (chapter eight), the scope of liability in war, both with respect
to combatants, non-combatants, those who assist combatants, and those who do not
(chapter nine), and finally addressing how citizenship may affect liability in war (chapter
ten). Throughout these chapters, he stays true to the underlying principles that drive his
account (namely, basic negative rights), providing a clear logic that one can follow from
his simplest assumptions all the way to the justification of war itself. Moreover, his purely
rights-based account provides novel answers to particular common objections, and subtle
arguments for common moral intuitions.
However, despite the many accomplishments of Draper’s work, there are a
number of significant shortcomings. The first is that his methodology is highly intuitionbased, rendering many of his arguments convincing to only those who already possess the
appropriate intuition. Potential principles or examples are tested only against his own bare
intuitions, leaving the reader uncertain of what to believe in cases where those intuitions
are not shared, thus rendering his conclusions suspect. Furthermore, the emphasis on
intuition often leads him to begin with conclusions and then work backward, calling into
question whether the aim is to develop a coherent rights-based account of the just war, as
he claims, or rather to simply fit rights-based intuitions to other common intuitions about
morality and war. This is most starkly exemplified in his discussion of DDA, where after
having considered and rejected a number of formulations he arrives at what he takes to be
the correct interpretation, saying that with it “we get the results we want in most of the
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cases we have considered thus far” (52, emphasis added). Now, the very idea of
determining which results one wants and then devising arguments to obtain them seems
suspect at best, and casts doubt on the conclusions he does reach.
Draper’s reliance on thought experiments and the intuitions they bring up also
leads him to drift away from his rights-account in many core arguments. This is not
necessarily a problem per se, but it does call into question the degree to which his account
really is a rights-enforcement account, and to what extent it is something novel and worth
pursuing. Draper characterizes his position as a “moderate deontological perspective,”
which skirts the boundary between absolutist principles and consequentialism. In this way,
he hopes to give rights their due while still paying heed to the moral relevance of
consequences, thereby explaining and also codifying the myriad intuitions that we have on
rights and war. However, his elucidation of what a “moderate deontological perspective”
entails provides absolutely no guide to weighing rights and consequences against one
another, despite having fully committed himself to just that. Consider the following
passage:
Suppose, for example, that by infringing upon one individual’s right to
life we can prevent someone else from infringing upon the right to life
of n individuals… Most moderate deontologists will say, for example,
that if n = 2 or even 10, then (ceteris paribus) our behavior is
unjustifiable, but if n = 1,000,000, 100,000, or even 10,000, our
behavior, if necessary in the relevant sense, is justifiable. (171)
Now, this is fine as far as intuitions go, but it does not tell us what the rights are good for
(if anything), given that they seem to not count for much so long as the consequences will
be good enough. Furthermore, it does not give an accounting of how the consequences and
rights weigh against each other, a crucial element to include if his rights-based account is
to provide anything more than an argument for placing a weight in the consequentialists’
scales. Moreover, it is not clear that Draper himself recognizes the tension, the near
contradiction, inherent in this position, as he just pages earlier states that:
[T]he moderate deontologist believes that, although, for example, killing
(even intentionally) someone who has a right not to be killed cannot be
justified simply by an appeal to overall consequences, if its consequences
are good enough, it is justified. (165)
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With such statements he makes clear that he is neither an absolutist deontologist nor a
consequentialist, but he fails to explain what his theory actually is, and how it in fact fits
between these competing schools of thought.
This brings us to the final critique, that Draper fails to provide any compelling
argument to convince us that his account is the only, or best, or even a better account than
those already on the market. At the outset, it appears as though this will not be problematic,
as he seems to endorse a form of theoretic agnosticism, instead providing an account of
what a rights-enforcement theory of the just war would look like, provided one was looking
for such a thing. However, as the arguments progress, he regularly attempts to justify or
motivate his position, at the expense of competing theories, without substantiating these
claims. The most striking example of this outright rejection of alternate theories without
arguing for such sweeping claims is in his treatment of the just war account of Jeff
McMahan, which has been incredibly influential in past

years. Draper presents

McMahan’s basic theory and then simply concludes that “because his [McMahan’s]
account is not a rights enforcement account, it is untenable” (100). Draper goes on to
provide a very brief justification for why this would be such a drastic failing for
McMahan’s position, but the core of his objection is simply that McMahan holds a theory
that is not ultimately about enforcing rights, as is Draper’s, and so must be wrong. This
species of “argument” is common in War and Individual Rights, and is problematic in that
it dismisses serious objections and counter-theories without providing reasons why. For a
book on the morality of war, such a cavalier attitude towards justifying one’s position
seems quite dangerous, given the magnitude of the conclusions.
However, all told, the book provides important insights about how rights and
violence interact, and gives, at the very least, a fruitful starting point for future rights-based
explorations of just war theory. More than this, the book makes a great contribution to the
literature on the morality of war by clearing up many aspects of the distinction between
doing and allowing harm, a common element of just war theories, and by providing a
plausible alternative to the doctrine of double effect, thereby giving deontological just war
accounts a more theoretically satisfactory manner to explain how it may sometimes be
permissible to harm the innocent in war. For these reasons it is well-worth exploring, even
given the above shortcomings.

